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RECENT CASES
REAL PROPERTY-"ONE MAN" CORPORATIONS-SOLE
SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST IN CORPORATE REALTY
-DOWER RIGHTS OF SOLE SHAREHOLDER'S SPOUSE
In a recent New Jersey case, Frank v. Frank's Inc, et a,,a the state's highest
court unanimously denied a widow's claim of dower in the real property of a
corporation in which her husband was once the sole shareholder.
The basis of the court's decision was that, although her husband was che
sole shareholder of a corporation whose only asset was realty, the corporation,
nevertheless, in the absence of fraud as to the plaintiff, held the land to it's ownl
use and not to the use of her husband. The court thus concluded that, since the
realty was at no time during the marriage legally or equitably owned by the husband,
it was not subject to her statutory dower claim.'
The facts of the case were these:
Decedent was the owner of a parcel of real estate which had a building on it.
He conducted his business there. In 1934 he was involved in an automobile accident.
Fearing entry of judgment against himself, he formed a corporation that's stated
purpose was -...to operate the busin'ess and acquire real estate." Thirteen shares

ot stock were issued: seven were issued to the decedent in consideration of his
transfer of the realty and the business to the corporation, one to his son and five
to a third person.
In due course, judgment was entered against the decedent (hereinafter referred
to as Frank). He thereupon filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Subsequently, Frank became acquainted with the present
plaintiff and in time they were married. Frank had by this time acquired all of the
outstanding shares of the corporation. The marriage continued for approximately
nine years after which the parties were separated. A suit was brought against Frank
for separate maintenance. 2 The court in that case ruled against the present plaintiff
giving as its reason that ".

.

. Frank neither abandoned nor separated nor neglected

to support her." Shortly thereafter Frank became totally disabled and transferred
all of the shares which he held to his two sons by a prior marriage in consideration
of their promise to support him for the rest of his life.
When Frank died, the widow brought her action. She alleged that at one
time during her coverture the decedent was sole stockholder of the corporation, and
that therefore the realty was held not by the corporation for itself, but "to his
la 87 A.2d 724 (1952).
1 N.J.S. 3A: 35-1; N.J.S.A. "The widow whether alien or not, of a person dying intestate or
otherwise shall be endowed, for the term of her natural life, of one full and equal half part of all
real estate whereof her husband or another to his use was seized of an estate of inheritance at any
time during the coverture."
2 Frank v. Frank, 76 A.2d 527 (1950).
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(Frank's) use" and that by statute she had a right of dower in the corporate
premises of the defendant. The trial court entertained doubts as to the plaintiff's
right to recover. However, believing itself bound by a prior case (Telis v. Telis,) 2
and a line of decisions in support of it, the court held that "since the corporation
was solely owned by Frank in the equitable sense it was a fraudulent attempt on his
part to deprive his wife of her right of dower in the property and that, therefore,
the premises were subject to her claim." On appeal the state's highest court distinguished the Frank case from the previous holdings and reversed the lower court.
On closer analysis several of the distinctions enumerated by the appellate court
seem to be of little merit. Others seem to be under emphasized. The court said
that in the Telis case "inchoate dower" was sought while in the Frank case "dower
consummate" is claimed. It is true that the two are not identical interests, for the
former does not rise to the status of dower consummate until the contingency
that the wife outlive the husband is fulfilled. The court fails to say in what maier
this variance in the interests claimed effects the difference in result of the cases
and the writer has been unable to discover any reason why it should.
As a second distinction in the cases the court finds that ". . . in this case the
husband formed the corporation a year and a half before he even knew the plaintiff
while in the previous case the entity was formed after marriage." This distinction
is emphasized by the court. It seems to be material since the circumstances and
situations of the parties would be pertinent to the issue of whether fraud was present in corporate formation. But it must be pointed out that the ultimate effect of
the corporate existence in both cases was to attempt to bar the spouse's claim of
dower.
Also the court continues "in the Frank case corporate officers were elected, the
shares were actually delivered to those to whom they were issued, meetings were
held and minutes kept while, in the former case none of these factors were present."
This distinction is borne out by the facts of the two cases but in many cases courts
do not hestitate to disregard the corporate personality where the circumstances so
warrant even though all of these technical requisites have been complied with. In
other cases the corporate formation is held valid though little or none of these
formalities have been met.
As an additional difference in the two cases the court points out that "... in
the present case the sons will be divested of rights acquired by the previous contract with their father if the corporate structure is disregarded while in the Telis
case there were no rights of third parties involved." This is a valid basis for distinguishing the cases since courts generally should act cautiously if their decision
might affect the previously acquired rights of innocent third persons who gave
value. But from the facts of the case it might be argued that the sons do not fall
within this class which the courts are eager to protect. The contract by which
2a 26 A.2d 249.
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they acquired the corporate shares was entered into while Frank was defending
a support action brought by the plaintiff in this action, and actual delivery of the
shares was delayed until Frank was awarded verdict in that action on appeal. Even
disregarding such circumstances of the contract and transfer and assuming that
they were innocent, the value that they gave was not great, for their father only
lived a short time after the promise of support was made to him. Also the sons
were at least morally bound to render support to their father in the absence of such
a contract. Although the rights of third persons might be extremely important in
some cases, this writer would be inclined to doubt that great significance should
attach to the rights of the third persons involved in this case.
Finally, the court brought out the distinction that in the prior case "... the
wife brought her suit to establish her dower in the property after the court had
awarded support to her and her children; but in this case two courts with juries
have determined that Frank had not deserted his wife or failed to support her."
This element of the instant case although not strongly emphasized by the court
seems to the writer to be the primary element in the court's decision. One might
wonder what the result in the Frank case would have been had the widow been
awarded a verdict in the previous support case, and thus the same in that respect
as the Telis case but retaining the other distinctions.
The court held that ".... a corporation though all of its stock is owned by one
person does not hold its property to the use of such shareholder but holds it for
the use of the corporation itself as an artificial entity which is as much recognized
by the law as any natural person." This is so, continued the court, despite the fact
that a sole shareholder has the power to dissolve the corporation and become owner
of the real property held by the corporation, ". . . for such right must be exercised in accordance with statute and subject to the rights of creditors." The court
then added that to hold to the contrary would "... . cause hardship to the corporate
creditors and confusion in the law of real property; for one would never be safe in
accepting title to realty from a corporation which has or has ever had a single beneficial owner."
The principle enunciated by the court is in accord with the overwhelming
weight of authority for it is well-settled in the law that a stockholder has neither
a legal nor an equitable title in the corporate property. "(H)is private property
includes his shares in the corporation, that is, the right which his membership gives
him to participate in the control of the corporation in its surplus or profits and
in the distribution of the corporate assets upon dissolution."' Thus it can be seen
that in a given case the finding by the court that a valid corporate entity exists, which
the court refuses to disregard, coupled with the above rule of law will necessarily
bar a dower claim in the corporate realty by the spouse of a former shareholder
8

Stevens on Corporations, p. 86; Donaldson v. Anderson, 300 Pa. 312. But compare, Warren v.
Davenport Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 764 which holds that "it is recognized that they have an indirect or
beneficial interest which will supply the insurable interest necessary to support a policy of insurance."
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in a "one man" corporation. This is so because if the corporation holds title to the
realty absolutely it cannot at the same time hold "... to the use of" its shareholders
so as to subject the realty to the dower statutes of the type enacted in New Jersey.
The Pennsylvania statutory provisions in respect to dower are contained in
the Intestate Act of 1947. Our statute4 is somewhat different in context from the
one enacted in New Jersey but this difference apparently would not alter a
decision by our courts should they be confronted with a factual situation like that
in the Frarnk case. In respect to realty both statutes give the widow a right to share
in that property which the deceased husband legally or equitably owned at the
time of his death. Both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes also give the
widow a right to share in any realty the husband legally or equitably owned at any
time during the coverture which he conveyed without her joinder. The claim of the
widow in the Frank case was directed against realty owned by a corporation in
which her husband prior to death had ceased to be a stockholder. Her contention
was that since at one time he was sole shareholder he was legally or equitably the
owner and when he transferred the shares to his sons he in effect conveyed the
realty by deed which lacked her joinder and therefore she had right to her dower
in the corporate premises. Thus it can be seen that no matter which of the two
statutes had been applied in the Frank case the claimant would still face the task
of showing that by reason of the husband's sole ownership of the stock he was
also owner of the corporate realty.
Our courts are entirely in accord with the premise set out in the Frank case
that "a shareholder has neither a legal nor an equitable title in the corporate property." It necessarily follows that as long as the validity of the corporation is upheld
the realty of the corporation will not be subject to any dower claims. Pennsylvania
does, however, adhere to the principle that ".... under some circumstances and in
particular cases the corporation may be disregarded as an intermediate between the

ultimate person and the adverse party."

Thus in a given case if the corporate

personality is used to "... defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or

when resorted to as evading a defined public policy," 6 the court will disregard
the entity and view the case as if the ultimate and the adverse party were the only
Intestate Act of 1947, 20 P.S. 1.5. "The shares or the estate to which the widow is entitled shall*
be in lieu and full satisfaction of her dower at common law, so far as relates to real estate of which
the husband dies seized; and her share in real state aliened by the husband in his lifetime, without
her joining in the conveyance her share shall be the same as her share in real estate of which the
husband dies seized..."
5 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, vol. 1, p. 134. Accord: Stony Brook
Lumber Co. v. Blackman, 286 Pa. 305, which case quotes 7 R.C.L., 27. "The doctrine, however, that
a corporation is a legal entity existing separate and apart from the person or persons composing it, is
a mere fiction, introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. This fiction
cannot be urged to an extent and purpose not within its reason or policy and it has been held in an
appropriate case, and in furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation and the individual or
individuals owning all of its stock and assets will be treated as identical."
6 Stevens on Corporations, p. 95.
4
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litigants involved. Might it not be argued that there is no stronger or more
dearly defined policy of the law than that which deters the courts from denying
a deserving widow of her dower.
The doser the observation, the more it seems apparent that the seemingly
inconsistent opinions in the Frank case and the Telis case can be harmonized. To
the writer the cases seem both to turn on the answer to the question-was the
corporate entity used to thwart a deserving widow's claim of dower? If the answer
is in the affirmative, then the courts will treat the case as if the corporation were
nonexistent. If it be in the negative, the courts will give the usual legal effect to
the corporate personality. If we view the two cases in the light of the comparative
equities, the two decisions can b'e harmonized without undue difficulty.
Kenneth J. Duffy
Member of the Senior Class

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-COMPENSABLE
UNEMPLOYMENT
In Golbuski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review' the facts
were these:
The plant in which the claimant was regularly employed had been
closed by the em loyer company for the purpose of taking inventory.
The company and the union of which the claimant was a member had
previously agreed that the company might use this two week shut-down
period as vacation time for those employees who were eligible for paid
vacations under the company's plan. The plan provided that those employees who had worked for the company for a certain period of time
would receive two weeks vacation with pay, and those with lesser time
would receive one week vacation with pay. Finally it provided that those
who lacked sufficient time to receive one week paid-vacation were not
entitled to any paid vacation. As to the first class there was no problem.
They were paid for the two weeks they were out of work and thus they
were not compensably "unemployed." Those who received one week paid
vacation were not "unemployed" for that week but there was a question
of whether or not they were entitled to use the other week as their "waiting week." 2 The main problem of the case concerned those in the third
class who had not received any vacation pay for the two week shut-down.
The local office of the Bureau of Employment Security allowed the claims
and the referee upheld the bureau's decision but the Board of Review
on appeal by thL employer reversed the referee and denied benefits.
1

171 Pa. Super. 634, 91 A.2d 218 (1952).

2 Act of 1936, December 5, P.L. 2897 § 401 (e), 43 P.S. § 801, provides that in order to be eligible

to receive benefits the claimants must have been unemployed for a waiting period of one week. This
case does not decide whether the employees in the second class could use the uncompensated
week as constituting their "waiting week." It would seem that they could since the claimants in the
third class were allowed the one week waiting period and benefits for the other week.
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The board used as the basis in its ruling the decision of the Superior Court in
the Mattey case. 8 They stressed one of the tests of eligibility for unemployment
comprensation, viz., "involuntary unemployment." On this point the Golbuski case
and the Mattey case are clearly distinguishable.
In the Mattey case the union and the company had agreed that the period from
June 27th to July 7th was to be the annual vacation period. The company had a
vacation plan similar to the one in the Golbuski case. It provided that those employees who had worked for a certain period of time would receive two weeks vacation with pay, those with a lesser time would receive one week vacation with pay
and those without sufficient time to receive one week paid vacation would not
receive any compensated vacation time. Here again the appeal involved those employees who had not sufficient time for any paid vacation. The decision in this
case was that the men were not involuntarily unemployed and thus they were not
entitled to un'employment benefits.
In the Mattey case the court and the board based their decisions on agency
law. They found that the union was the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees and since the union asked for and agreed to this vacation period the employees were bound by the union action and could not say that they were not voluntarily unemployed. The board thought this same reasoning applied in the Golbuski
case.
The facts in the Golbuski case differed materially, however, from the situation in the Mattey case. First of all, in the Mattey case by their original contract
the company and the union agreed that the establishment should be closed for vacation. In the Golbuski case the union did not agree that the plant might be closed
for vacation; they agreed that the company might designate any period when the
plant was closed for any reason as the time to give compensated vacations to those
who were 'entitled to them. Secondly, in the Mattey case the establishment was
actually closed for vacation time while in the Golbuski case the claims at issue were
filed while the plant was closed for the purpose of taking inventory. It was for
the company's ben'efit and the union had not agreed to have such shut-downs operate as a vacation for those who were not entitled to paid vacations.
in both cases the union acted as the agent for the employees but in the Golbuski
case the union never agreed to the creation of any unemployment, so one could not
say that the employees consented to become unemployed. It is true that the union
agreed that the period in question might be used as vacation time for those who
had compensated vacation time coming, but this was only an agreement to the
allocation of vacations by the employer in accordance with the right reserved to the
employer in the original contract.4 Under agency principles, therefore, while the
8 Mattey Unemployment Compensation

Case, 164 Pa. Super. 36, 163 A.2d 429 (1949).

4 The original contract provided: "Promptly after January 1 of each calendar year each eligible employee shall be requested to specify the vacation period he desires . . . but the final right to allot
vacation periods . . . is exclusively reserved to the company."
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acts of the union were the acts of the employees, since the union had never agreed
that the employees should be laid off, they were in fact involuntarily unemployed.
Consequently on the test of "involuntary unemployment" the court decided that
the men were involuntarily unemployed and reversed the board's disallowance.
It should be noted that "involuntary unemployment" is only one of a number
of tests of eligibility for unemployment compensation of persons unemployed
during shut-downs and vacation periods. 5 There are other tests, for example "availability for work," which are not fully discussed in the Golbuski case. On the test
of involuntary unemployment and under agency principles, however, it is apparent
that the ruling in the Mattey case did not apply and that the decision in the Golbuski
case is a sound one.

Richard J. Murray
Member of the Middler Class

TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-EFFECT OF LAPSE OF TIME
AF1TER PRIVILEGED EVENT-USE OF PHOTOGRAPH
FOR PRIVATE RATHER THAN NEWS PURPOSES
The plaintiff, a child of ten, was photographed as a woman bystander was
lifting the child to her feet after nearly being run down by a motor car. The following day the photograph appeared in a Birmingham (Ala.) newspaper and
twenty months later it was used by the defendant as an illustration for an article on traffic accidents emphasizing pedestrian carelessness entitled, "They Ask
To Be Killed." The plaintiff claims that this second publication of her picture
twenty months after the accident was an invasion of her right of privacy. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1
The two issues presented by this case are:
(1) How long after the event that draws one into the public eye
does the privilege of publicity exist?, and
(2) May a photograph, which was privileged as a waiver of the
iht of privacy because of public interest, be used for another purpose
without liability?
(1) How long after the event that draws one into the public eye does the
privilege of publicity exist?
5

Act of 1936, December 5, P.L. 2897 § 401, 43 P.S. § 801.
1 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Company, 192 F.2d 974 (1951).
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Act of 1936, December 5, P.L. 2897 § 401, 43 P.S. § 801.
1 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Company, 192 F.2d 974 (1951).
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One who is the subject of a striking catastrophe is the object of legitimate
public interest.2 By drawing public attention or participating in activities which
have a public interest, the individual waives his right of privacy. Persons occupying prominent positions in public life and government impliedly grant the right
to the public of their pictures. s Where a person has placed himself in the public
eye, as an actor or candidate for public office, or where one has become newsworthy and the object of legitimate public interest, his right of privacy is limited. 4 The interest of the public in being informed overbalances the right to be
left alone.
Must such a person who once received publicity for an act go through his entire
life with possible republication of his infamy haunting him? Is the privilege lost
by lapse of time? The plaintiff admits that the original publicaton of her picture
was not an actionable invasion of her right of privacy, but says that its reappearance twenty months later was because it was no longer newsworthy.
William James Sidis was a child mathematics prodigy, who lectured to a
group of Harvard professors on the fourth dimension at the age of 11 and was
included in an article "Where Are They Now?" thirty years later describing his
career since his childhood days. The court did not permit him recovery.5 This
article, although written to promote sales of the magazine, contained information
of public interest.
The experiences of a hold-up victim were related on a radio program, "Calling All Cars," seventeen months after its occurrence and he recovered.0 However,
the court apparently based its decision on the fact that the story was used for entertainment rather than news purposes.
The film, "The Red Kimono," led to a suit involving the invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy. The plaintiff, a denizen of the underworld and a prostitute, was tried for murder and was acquitted, thereupon abandoning her life of
shame and becoming rehabilitated. She married and was settled in a new community when the film using her single name was released. It was held that there was
no cause of action because the unsavory incidents of the plaintiff's former life
were on public record. 7
From these three decisions it seems to follow that publication of an article,
photograph, or other "news" item does not violate one's right of privacy merely
because of lapse of time alone, but that other factors must be present for the plaintiff to recover. Furthermore, the Sidis case and the case involving the hold-up
victim seem to substantiate the conclusion that the right of privacy is not violated
2 Restatement, Torts, § 867 (1939).
3 Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel v. Restaurant Employees International Alliance and Bartenders International League of America, 6 Ohio Supp. 276.
4 Gill v. Curtis Publishing Company, 231 P. 2d 565 (1952).
5 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Company, 34 F. Supp. 19.
6 Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc. et al., 28 F. Supp. 845.
7 Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (1931).
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by reappearance of a newsworthy item solely because time has elapsed between
the original admittedly privileged publication and its recurrenct.
(2) May a photograph which was privileged as a waiver of the right of privacy because of public interest be used for another purpose without liability?
The cases on this point are in unanimous agreement that a photograph taken
for one purpose may not be used for any other. A photographer employed to take
patron's picture cannot make additional copies and use them for his own purposes without authorization. 8 The unauthorized use of a photograph of a person
for commercial purposes is generally an invasion of his right of privacy.
A Pennsylvania decision 9 directly on point prohibited a doctor from exhibiting photographs of a semiconscious patient to his classes to illustrate the patient's
facial disfiguration resulting from coronary thrombosis. The doctor had taken
the pictures without the permission of the plaintiff or her family.
While the appellee was serving with a mobile optical unit, the War Department took his picture and published it in a United States' news item of military
activities overseas. The appellant, engaged in private enterprise, used the picture
as appelle-e endorsing his product. Appellee recovered.10
Pictures and letters were published to induce others to become sales representatives. As long as they were under a trade magazine this was permissible,
but this privilege did not extend to a popular magazine."1
These illustrative cases show that a photograph cannot be used unless it is
used for a privileged purpose or unless the right of privacy is waived.
Of course, all of the foresoing discussion is based on the theory that an invasion of the "right of privacy" is a tort. Perhaps, a summary of the history of
the concept would better enable us to reach a conclusion as to the stand the various jurisdictions will take toward the problems raised in the Leverton case.
Unknown to the common law, the concept of the right of privacy is of recent development. The doctrine was first discussed in an article by Professor Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, later to become Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.12
Recently numerous articles have been written on this subject in legal periodicals1 8 and the Restatement of Torts recognizes its existence. 14 Included among
8 Itinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P. 2d 438, 166 Ore. 482, 138 A.L.R. 1 (1940).
0 Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 D. & C. 543 (1940).
10 Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E. 2d 306 (1949).
11 Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 9 N.E. 2d 393, 298 Mass. 1 (1937).
12 Brandeis and Warren, Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
18 Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy. 48 Col. L."Rev. 713 (1948); Nizer,
The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1941); 40 Geo. L. J. 633 (1952) ; 25 Temp. L. Q.
(1951); 5 Vand. L. Rev. 116 (1951); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772; 21 Fordham L. Rev. 79 (1952).
14 Restatement, Torts, § 867 (1939).
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those states that have adopted this principle, at least to some extent, are: Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, 15 Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and
Washington.
The right of privacy is derived from natural law, having its foundation in
the instincts of nature. 16 Most humans resent any encroachment by the public on
their rights, particularly those of a private nature. The right to life has come to
mean the right to enjoy life-to be left alone. 17 The invasion of this right is a
tort.1 8 The interest invaded is that interest a person has in being left alone.
Pennsylvania's first decision on this subject is that of Owen v. Henman,19 holding that no right of action exists for a worshipper in a church who was annoyed
by another "making loud noises in singing, reading, and talking." However, since
then a few other Pennsylvania cases have recognized the right of privacy,2 0 the federal district court decision here being the latest.
Conclusion
Thus, in those states (including Pennsylvania) that recognize that an invasion of the right of privacy is a tort, the problems raised in the Leverton case
will undoubtedly be resolved in the following manner.
(1) A mere lapse of time between the happening of the event and its first
privileged publication immediately thereafter and its recurrence sometime later
is not a violation of one's right of privacy.
(2) Using a once privileged printing for another purpose is a violation of
one's right of privacy. In every case in which this was the issue upon which the
case was decided, it was held that a photograph cannot be used without the subject's permission for any purpose other than the one for which it was taken.
JO ANN NATALIE ESTERLY
Member of the Middler Class
16 New York Civil Rights Law, Consolidated Laws, N.Y., ch. 6 §§ 50, 51.
16 Peavy v. Curtis Publishing Company, 78 F. Supp. 305 (1948).
17 Cooley on Torts, 4th Ed., vol. 1, § 135; see also n. 2, supra.

18 "The right of privacy is a legal right entitled to judicial protection.", Pavesich v. New Eng-

land Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2
Ann. Cases 561 (1904).
19 Owen v. Henman, 1 W. & S. 548, 37 Am. Dec. 481 (1841).
20 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Company, 97 F. Supp. 181, affirmed 192 F.2d 974; Harlow v.
Buno Co., 36 D. & C. 101 (1939); Waring v. W.D.A.S., 327 Pa. 433 (1937); Lisowski, etc.,
et vir v. Joskiewiez et vir, 76 D. & C. 79 (1951).
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CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-DUTY TO RETREATATTACKED IN PLACE OF BUSINESS
In State v. Baratta1 the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. On appeal the cause was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of
Iowa which held, inter alia, that the instructions as to the law of self-defense were
contradictory.
This case is illustrative of the trend by the majority of American courts to depart from the old common-law rule of "retreat to the wall." 2 The court, in this
case, emphatically upholds the rule that a person unlawfully attacked in his place
of business may m'eet force with force, even to the extent of taking life, if it is necessary or reasonably appears to be necessary.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The defendant was the owner
and operator of a tavern; the deceased was a patron. The deceased became engaged
in an altercation with another patron and defendant came to the scene of the controversy to find out what was going on. During the conversation which followed,
the defendant challenged the deceased to take off his glasses and fight. The defendant apparently changed his mind, however, and told the deceased to get out of the
tavern. There was evidence which indicated that as the deceased was walking peacefully out of the tavern, the defendant struck him on the head with his fist; the
deceased fell, striking his head against the wall of the building. As a result of these
blows on his head, the deceased died.
But there also was testimony for the defendant that the deceased turned and
started back towards defendant with his arm raised as if to strike him. Although
the state's evidence controverted this, it dearly raised an issue of self-defense which
the trial court recognized and upon which it instructed.
On appeal, defendant made the contention that in part of instruction No. 11,
the court laid down the correct rule governing the law of self-defense; but that in
one sentence of this instruction and in instruction No. 12, the jury was given a
different, contradictory and erroneous rule. The challenged part of No. 11 contains the statement that def'endant had the right to kill in self-defense, "if that
seemed to be the only means of preventing such injury or death." Instruction No. 12
doses with the words, "to be the only means of preventing the threatened injury
or death."
In discussing the above instructions, the Supreme Court of Iowa held as
follows:
"The duty to retreat is not mentioned in specific terms; but we think
that the average juror, being told that defendant could use force sufficient
to kill only if that was the only means of preventing his own death or
--
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49 N.W.2d 866 (1951).

2 Beal, "Retreat from a Murderous Assault," 16 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1902-1903); Levine, 5 Wis. L.
Rev. 500 (1928-1930).
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injury, would immediately turn to the thought of retreat as the likeliest
other means.' Retreat has always been recognized as the most promising
way of promoting one's safety from danger."
After further discussion on the instructions, the court stated the following rule
of law:
"We are committed to the rule that a person attacked in his home,
or place of business, may meet force with force, even to the extent of taking life if it is necessary or appears to be necessary. The doctrine of 'retreat to the wall' in such cases has been expressly repudiated." 8
It is necessary to note that most courts will not extend this majority view to
allow a person, who is violently attacked, to kill his assailant, without retreating
from his place of business, if that business is unlawful. 4 The majority rule seems
to be then that even though the right of a person to defend himself, without retreating, exists in all cases where the defendant is in his dwelling at the time of
the attack, this right extends to a place of business only when the business conducted
at such place is a lawful one. 5
In some jurisdictions the doctrine of "retreat to the wall" has been frankly
modified and limited as no longer applicable to modem living conditions. 6 A few
courts go so far as to say that where a person is in any place where he has a lawful
right to be and is unlawfully assaulted by another or put in apparent danger of
his life or great bodily harm, he need not retreat but may lawfully stand his ground
and meet force with force even to the extent of taking his assailant's life if it is
necessary or apparently necessary to save his own life or to prevent great bodily
7
harm.
It is of interest to note the following part of the opinion written by Justice
Holmes in Brown v. United States:8
"Rationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered
with all the others in order to determine whether defendant went farther
than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt."
The Pennsylvania courts have been inclined to follow the old common-law
rules as to the law of self-defense. In the recent case, Commonwealth v. Fraser,9
8 State v. Sipes, 202 Iowa 173, 209 N.W. 458, 47 A.L.R. 407 (1926) ; State v. Leeper, 199 Iowa
432, 200 N.W. 732, 736 (1924). Cf., 94 Ky. 322, 22 S.W. 333 (1893).
4 Hill v. State, 194 Ala. 11, 69 S.941, 2 A.L.R. 509 (1915), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 544 (1915-1916),
16 Col. L. Rev. 156 (1916) ; State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 34 A.L.R. 1477 (1924);
Cf., 61 Fla. 50, 54 S. 360 (1911) and 64 Cal. App. 27, 220 p. 315 (1923).
5 Hill v. State, supra n. 4, 2 A.L.R. 509.
6 Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law, 212 (1934) (Hornbook Series).
'7 People v. Smith, 404 Ill.
350, 88 N.E.2d 834 (1949); 40 C.J.S., Homicide, 1015, § 130.
t 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S. Ct. 501, 65 L.Ed. 961, 18 A.L.R. 1276 (1921). Note also Beard v.
United States, 158 U.S. 550, 559, 15 S. Ct. 962, 39 L.Ed. 1086 (1894).
9 369 Pa. 273, 85 A.2d 126 (1952).
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the court emphatically followed the common-law rule that a person, who-without fault-is attacked in his own home, need not retreat (even though he can
do so without increasing his danger) but may lawfully resist even to the extent
of taking life if necessary.
The doctrine followed in Commonwealth v. Fraser has been strictly and
narrowly construed by the Pennsylvania courts. In Commonwealth v. Johnson,10
it was held that where the house in which the homicide was committed was the
property of the defendant's wife, who was also the mother of the deceased, and
both the defendant and the deceased were members of her family, the ordinary
rules of self-defense were alone applicable, and the rights of a householder against
a violent intruder did not apply. In Commonwealth v. Brown," the court held
that a house cannot be said to be the owner's castle, within the meaning of the rule
of law with reference to the use of force in defense of it, where it is not used as
a dwelling but merely as a storehouse.
Although the Pennsylvania courts have not allowed a person violently attacked in his place of business to kill his assailant if necessary or apparently necessary to save his own life, it is interesting to note the following instruction of the
12
court in Commonwealth v. Foster:
"We say to you that any person in that barroom, whether they
were personally attacked or not, would have had a right to have killed
any or all of these three men who entered for that purpose (robbery)."
From the above instruction it would seem that the Pennsylvania courts will
not force a person, in his own or in another's place of business, to retreat from an
assailant who has entered the premises for the purpose of committing a felony.
How far will the American courts go in modifying the common-law rule of
"retreat to the wall?" This is a difficult question to answer and one which only
time and experience can determine. Although some cases have carried the exceptions
to extremes,18 the exceptions created and accepted by the majority of courts are
basically sound. It seems certain that the exception, as illustrated by this case, that
on unlawfully attacked in his place of business need not retreat, is now firmly
established as part of the criminal law of the majority of American states. 14
Donald C. Taylor
Member of the Middler Class

10 213 Pa. 432, 62 A. 1064 (1906).

11 14 Erie 63, 6 Sor. 50 (1932).
12 364 Pa. 288, 72 A.2d 279 (1950).
13 State v. Borwich, 193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460 (1922).
14 Other recent cases: State v. Sally, 233 N.C. 225, 63 S.E.2d 151 (1951) ; State v. Pennell, 231
N.C. 651, 58 S.E.2d 341 (1950); Bryant v. State, 252 Ale. 153, 39 S.2d 657 (1949).

